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‘Any person that shall inspect the minutes of our assembly and peruse only the titles 
of those acts which they annually frame, alter or amend will be convinced that our 
claim of legislation … is grounded in reason, just policy and the necessity of the 
case’, concluded the Jamaican planter Edward Long in his history of Jamaica in 1774.  
He added that ‘the greater part of them are merely local or provincial, some calculated 
for only temporary ends, others to take effect as probationary, and to be rescinded 
again or gradually enlarged and amended, according as experience may determine 
their good or evil operation’.1  Thirty years later his successor Bryan Edward similarly 
noted that, ‘the English laws being silent, the colonial legislature has made and 
continues to make such provision therein as the exigencies of the colony are supposed 
to require’, not least the system of slavery and plantation agriculture, ‘[and] where the 
principle of the English law has been adopted, it has been found necessary to alter and 
modify its provisions so as to adapt them to circumstances and situation’.2  Both Long 
and Edwards therefore assumed the operation of an active colonial legislature, which 
dealt not just in matters of high constitutional principle but also the mundane political 
and legislative business needed to make society – and slavery – function effectively. 
 
These assumptions reflected the development of legislative bodies in the British Isles 
and North America in the eighteenth century.  Beyond their celebrated constitutional 
triumphs in seizing power at different points from a reluctant executive, there was a 
parallel legislative revolution that transformed these legislatures into instruments of 
public policy.  Quantitative studies of British and Irish law-making up to 1800 have 
demonstrated that there was a vast upsurge in legislative output during this period, 
                                                 
1 Edward Long, The History of Jamaica, or, General survey of the antient and modern state of that 
island (3 vols., London, 1774) vol. i, 21-2 
2 Bryan Edwards, The history, civil and commercial, of the British colonies in the West Indies (3 vols., 
London, 1793-1801) vol. i, 273-4 
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much of it intended to reshape the societies and economies that lay within – and, in 
the case of the Westminster parliament, beyond – their borders.  The colonial houses 
of assembly of North America similarly expanded in scope and scale throughout this 
period.  The ‘transatlantic constitution’ of imperial law and institutions emerged as a 
framework to try regulate and manage the exercise of this legislative capacity, in a 
process that also extended to the numerous British colonies in the West Indies and 
continued well beyond the withdrawal of the North American colonies from this 
transatlantic constitution in 1783.  However, viewing the legislative process instead 
from West Indies rather than from North America emphasises not only their political 
and institutional overlaps, and thus the highly contingent nature of the many factors 
which forced the mainland colonies out of the transatlantic constitution, but also the 
parallel evolution of these overlapping elements beyond the break of 1783. 
 
This article therefore offers a quantitative survey of the legislative process in Jamaica, 
the largest and richest island in the British West Indies, between the first assembly in 
1664 and the major social and political reconfigurations that ended enslaved labour in 
1838.  It concludes that the volume of legislation increased massively in this period, 
in line with similar increases in Britain and Ireland, reflecting the growing political 
power of the assembly and a continuing upsurge in demand from local interest groups.  
It was, moreover, a collaborative process.  Although studies of Jamaica, the West 
Indies and North America generally place the most stress on violent confrontations 
between colonial and imperial elites, this tended to be the exception rather than the 
rule, and served mainly to delineate spheres of influence within which each side could 
operate.  The transatlantic constitution was able to accommodate these developments, 
providing an alternative path for political development that differed from Britain, 
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Ireland and North America but amounted, in ways that the historiography has not yet 
recognised, to a transatlantic legislative revolution. 
 
-I- 
 
‘It has been a commonly-received opinion’, Long admitted, ‘that the people of this 
island are fond of opposition to their governors, [and] that they are ever discontented 
and factious’.  He laboured to prove otherwise, but this view was broadly accepted by 
contemporaries, and by historians Agnes Whitson and George Metcalf in their studies 
of island politics up to 1783, as well as broader surveys of the West Indies by Lowell 
Ragatz and others.3  Studies from the imperial perspective by Helen Taft Manning and 
others tended to endorse this picture, perhaps reflecting their imperial focus, in which 
colonial elites appeared many as obstacles unable to conceive of the unity of empire.4  
‘Perhaps nothing is more extraordinary in English institutional history than the part 
played by these little bodies’, noted Manning, for example, ‘… [as] the British 
constitutional tradition sustained them in a sense of their own importance and allowed 
them to make good their pretensions in the eyes of the highest legal authorities in 
Great Britain’.5  More recent work by Jack Greene and others has offered a valuable 
corrective by stressing the ideological sophistication of elites in Jamaica and the West 
                                                 
3 Agnes M. Whitson, The constitutional development of Jamaica, 1660 to 1729 (Manchester, 1929) pp. 
158-67; George Metcalf, Royal government and political conflict in Jamaica, 1729-1783 (London, 
1965) pp. 232-7; Lowell J. Ragatz, The fall of the planter class in the British Caribbean, 1763-1833: a 
study in social and economic history (New York; London, 1928) pp. 44-54; Frederick G. Spurdle, 
Early West Indian government: showing the progress of government in Barbados, Jamaica and the 
Leeward Islands, 1660-1783 (Palmerston North, New Zealand, 1962) pp. 7-27, 50-75; Neville A.T. 
Hall, ‘Constitutional and political developments in Barbados and Jamaica, 1783-1815’, (DPhil Thesis, 
University of London, 1965) pp. 26-9, 47-57 
4 Helen Taft Manning, British colonial government after the American Revolution, 1782-1820 
(Hamden, Conn, 1966), esp. pp. 108-9, 128-9; D. J. Murray, The West Indies and the development of 
colonial government, 1801-1834 (Oxford, 1965) pp. xi-xiii; William A. Green, British slave 
emancipation: the sugar colonies and the great experiment, 1830-1865 (Oxford, 1976) pp. 65-74, 90-3 
5 Manning, British colonial government, pp. 128-9 
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Indies, and the political languages of liberty and property that they shared with their 
counterparts on the mainland.6  A controversy over legislative privilege in the 1760s, 
for example, ‘was one of many similar incidents during which men on opposite sides 
of the Atlantic had been hammering out constitutional arrangements’ since the late 
seventeenth century.’7  Yet by focussing on moments of confrontation within the elite 
this had tended to reinforce the picture of a truculent, fractious and obstinate assembly 
that was more concerned with its privileges and liberties than with sound government. 
 
Approaching this society from the bottom-up, however, has suggested that the white 
societies of the West Indies were not entirely dysfunctional.  Elsa Goveia and others 
have highlighted how comprehensive laws and legal codes were successfully created 
by assemblies to structure slavery and slave-holding in various islands.8  The claim 
that Jamaica developed a stable ‘creole society’ between 1770 and 1820, which 
mingled European and African elements to find a social equilibrium, has focussed 
attention on the mundane social and cultural transactions that held this white society 
together, and structured its relations to slaves and ‘free coloureds’.9  Most recently, 
Diana Paton has demonstrated the collaboration between governors, assembly and 
parish vestries created the legislative framework for a complex penal system that 
                                                 
6 Jack P. Greene, ‘The Jamaica privilege controversy, 1764-1766: an episode in the process of 
constitutional definition in the early modern British empire’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth 
History, 22 (1994) pp. 16-53 and, more broadly, see Peripheries and Center: constitutional 
development in the extended polities of the British Empire and the United States, 1607-1788 (Athens, 
GA, 1986) and The constitutional origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, 2011).  See also 
Christer Petley, Slaveholders in Jamaica: colonial society and culture during the era of abolition 
(London, 2009) pp. 35-43; Michael Watson, ‘The British West India legislatures in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries: an historiographical introduction’, Parliamentary History, 14 (1995) pp. 89-98; 
Andrew O’Shaughnessy, An empire divided: the American Revolution and the British Caribbean 
(Philadelphia, 2000) pp. 81-126; P.J. Marshall, The making and unmaking of empires: Britain, India 
and America, c.1750-1783, (Oxford, 2005), pp. 158-181. 
7 Greene, ‘Jamaica privilege controversy’, p. 16 
8 See below nn. 73  
9 Kamau Brathwaite, The development of Creole society in Jamaica, 1770-1820 (Oxford, 1971) pp. 9-
23, 68-79; Petley, Slaveholders in Jamaica, pp. 53-67; Trevor G. Burnard, Mastery, tyranny, and 
desire: Thomas Thistlewood and his slaves in the Anglo-Jamaican world (Jamaica, 2004) pp. 70-100 
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supported the wider slave society of the island.  ‘State decisions were not simply 
worked out in conflict between local and imperial elites’, she notes, ‘…[but] in ways 
that were significantly influenced by local contestation and negotiations’, and worked 
out both in the assembly itself and through the expanding public sphere in Jamaica.10 
 
This suggests that the assembly in Jamaica was expanding both the range and extent 
of its power and responsibilities at a moment when parliaments in Britain, Ireland and 
North America were undergoing in a similar process of evolution.  Nearly 19,000 bills 
were introduced into the Westminster Parliament between 1660 and 1800, around half 
of these in the forty years after 1760, and about 14,000 became law.11 ‘This dramatic 
rise in legislative output was a most remarkable development’, notes Hoppit, ‘and one 
of significance for historians of all shades’, since it helped to integrate local interests 
into a national system and made legislative intervention matters a norm.12  Work since 
then has focussed on identifying the provincial, mercantile and social interest groups 
that began to use the powers of parliamentary legislation for their own ends, shaping 
areas such as the criminal code and poor law in ways that owed little to government.13  
The conceptual scope and geographical ambitions of legislation also increased.  Not 
only did the Parliament in Westminster now increasingly legislate for Scotland and 
Ireland, it also claimed the right to pass laws for its imperial territories, even after the 
salutary lessons of 1776.  At least 191 imperial acts were passed between 1660 and 
1800 relating to imperial trade alone, most of them after 1760, and this pattern did not 
                                                 
10 Diana Paton, No bond but the law: punishment, race, and gender in Jamaican state formation, 1780-
1870 (Durham, NC, 2004) pp., quotation on p. 17 
11 Julian Hoppit, ‘Patterns of parliamentary legislation, 1660-1800’, Historical Journal, 39 (1996) pp. 
109-31. 
12 Ibid. p. 109 
13 Joanna Innes, ‘The local acts of a national Parliament: Parliament's role in sanctioning local action in 
eighteenth-century Britain’, in Joanna Innes, ed., Inferior politics: social problems and social policies 
in eighteenth-century Britain (Oxford, 2009) pp. 78-105; Joanna Innes, ‘Parliament and the shaping of 
eighteenth-century English social policy’, in Joanna Innes, ed., Inferior politics: social problems and 
social policies in eighteenth-century Britain (Oxford, 2009) pp. 21-44 and below n. 63. 
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radically alter until the 1860s.14  ‘The volume of imperial legislation passing through 
Parliament was hardly burdensome’, concludes Miles Taylor, noting that it comprised 
only two percent of total legislation between 1801 and 1840, ‘…but even as a steady 
drip as opposed to a flood, imperial legislation could be complex’, encompassing 
contentious issues as trade, religion and slavery that trespassed on internal matters.15  
 
David Hayton and James Kelly have likewise demonstrated that the Irish Parliament, 
itself simultaneously a colonial state and ancien regime, also expanded the range and 
scope of legislative activity in this period, with about 3,450 bills between 1692 and 
1800 producing about 2,300 acts, at least half of them between 1771 and 1800.16  This 
was achieved despite the restrictions imposed by Poynings’ Law before 1782, which 
gave the Irish and British privy councils control of the legislative process and could 
only be evaded by a legal loophole which allowed the parliament to debate ‘heads of 
bills’.17  Westminster occasionally legislated for Ireland, as noted above, and used its 
power under Poynings’ Law to amend or disallow bills, but the bulk of legislation in 
Ireland was therefore domestic in origin.  It was used, among other things, to create an 
extensive set of fiscal-military state structures and a corpus of discriminatory social 
and religious legislation known as the ‘penal laws’, described in more detail below, 
but also a wide range of social and economic legislation urged by interest groups 
                                                 
14 Julian Hoppit, ‘Economic legislation and Britain's empire’ (unpublished working paper, 2016); 
Joanna Innes, ‘Legislating for three kingdoms: how the Westminster Parliament legislated for England, 
Scotland and Ireland, 1707-1830’, in Julian Hoppit, ed., Parliaments, nations and identities in Britain 
and Ireland, 1660-1850 (Manchester, 2003) pp. 15-47; Miles Taylor, ‘Colonial representation at 
Westminster, c. 1800-65’, in Julian Hoppit, ed., Parliaments, nations and identities in Britain and 
Ireland, 1660-1850 (Manchester, 2003) pp. 207-10 
15 Taylor, ‘Colonial representation’, p. 209.  For an overview of imperial legislation and slavery, see 
Robert Livingston Schuyler, Parliament and the British Empire: some constitutional controversies 
concerning imperial legislative jurisdiction (New York, 1929) pp. 117-92 
16 David Hayton, ‘Introduction: the Long Apprenticeship’, Parliamentary History, 20 (2001) pp. 7-12  
17 Ibid. pp. 13-4; James Kelly, Poynings' law and the making of law in Ireland, 1660-1800 (Dublin, 
2007), esp. pp. 8-11, 309, 358-61 
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within the island.18  ‘Tthe impression conveyed, as early as the 1730s’, notes Hayton, 
‘…[is] one of an institution whose members believed it had already come of age’.19   
 
Quantification and categorisation of legislative output in Britain and Ireland therefore 
captures an important process of political development, and can be extended to assess 
the nature of political, social and economic change in the transatlantic world, where 
most British territories had active – many imperial officials thought over-active – 
assemblies.  They have nevertheless been examined by Jack Greene and others mainly 
as political and constitutional, rather than legislative, institutions.  ‘Understandable 
and useful as this approach is’, noted Alison Olson in 1991, ‘… it has obscured other 
questions’, particularly how interest groups began to look to assemblies in the mid-
eighteenth century to solve issues that could not be addressed at a local or imperial 
level, eventually making it possible to envisage outright independence.20  If one half 
of the transatlantic constitution recently described by Sarah Mary Bilder was the 
framework of imperial courts and councils that reviewed colonial legislation, the other 
half was the system of colonies assemblies that created it.21  However, these have not 
yet been studied systematically for their quantitative patterns of legislation, and both 
Bilder and Olson have in any case focussed in assemblies in North America rather 
than their counterparts in the West Indies.22  The next three sections show that the 
                                                 
18 Charles Ivar McGrath, Ireland and empire, 1692-1770 (London, 2012) pp. 69-216.  For the penal 
laws, see below n. 74.  For social and economic legislation, see Eoin Magennis, ‘The Irish Parliament 
and the regulatory impulse, 1692-1800: the case of the coal trade’, Parliamentary History, 33 (2014) 
pp. 54-72; Andrew Sneddon, ‘Legislating for economic development: Irish fisheries as a case study in 
the limitations of improvement’, in David Hayton, James Kelly, and John Bergin, eds., The eighteenth-
century composite state: representative institutions in Ireland and Europe, 1689-1800 (London, 2010) 
pp. 146-59 
19 Hayton, ‘Long Apprenticeship’, p. 15 
20 Alison Olson, ‘Eighteenth-century colonial legislatures and their constituents’, Journal of American 
History, 79 (1992) pp. 543-67.  Quotation on p. 544 
21 Mary Sarah Bilder, The transatlantic constitution: colonial legal culture and the empire (Cambridge, 
MA, 2004)  
22 See below n. 65 
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assembly of Jamaica developed along very similar lines to its counterparts in Britain, 
Ireland and North America in this period, suggesting an overlapping experience of 
political and legislative development that continued beyond the rejection of the 
transatlantic constitution by the colonies of North America in 1783. 
 
-II- 
 
Jamaica was Britain’s largest and richest possession in the West Indies, its population 
rising from several hundred at the time of its first assembly in 1664 to about 410,000 
in 1800.  Its wealth, like the other islands of the West Indies, was built on sugar, and 
ninety percent of the population were therefore black slaves imported from West 
Africa to labour under brutal conditions on behalf of the small white elite, which did 
not exceed about 30,000 in 1800.  The need to control this large, hostile and alien 
population shaped the politics, society and culture of the island, but this small white 
elite, as noted above, also created a ‘creole’ society that attempted to replicate the 
ancien regime society they had left behind in England.  Hierarchies persisted, despite 
the racial solidarity and egalitarianism required by the slave society, and women and 
Jews were excluded from power, limiting the franchise to a smaller group of planters, 
merchants and professionals who satisfied the property qualification and could act as 
judges and magistrates, serve as public officials, and elect members of the assembly, 
or even sit there themselves.23  The assembly itself was composed of just over forty 
members, elected by the freeholders of about twenty parishes, though high franchise 
requirements made for tiny electorates.  About 1,572 votes were cast in elections in 
1816, for example, representing perhaps about six percent of the white population and 
                                                 
23 Brathwaite, Creole society, pp. 40-59; Petley, Slaveholders in Jamaica, pp. 60-2 
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less than half a percent of the total population.  This was narrower than all but the 
most rotten boroughs in Britain, but many elections were nevertheless conducted in 
much the same way, with candidates placing advertisements in local newspapers and 
offering hospitality to voters in order to confirm their obligations to local interests.24 
 
The political machinery of Jamaica was also modelled, very deliberately, on English 
practice.  The house of assembly was first convened in January 1664 and immediately 
insisted that it had the same powers and privileges as its counterpart in Westminster to 
initiate legislation, with the island’s council acting as the upper chamber and revising 
bills and the governor, as representative of the Crown, accepting or rejecting them.25  
Bills were initiated on the motion of individual members, or by order of the house, 
often prompted by petitions or the advice of standing and ad hoc committees.26  The 
bill was laid before the house for its first reading, and if it was approved a date would 
be fixed for its second reading.  It would then be debated and was generally sent to a 
committee, sometimes a committee of the whole house, to be examined and amended, 
and once these were approved the bill would be engrossed and read a third time, then 
carried up to the council for discussion.  Opponents had multiple chances to wreck the 
bill, however, by calling divisions, adding wrecking amendments or even simply by 
deferring discussion until the assembly was dissolved or prorogued.  The council in 
turn might also chose to accept or reject the bill, or amend it and send it back to the 
house, who could then only accept the amendments or reject them in toto, though 
sometimes a joint committee was convened to hammer out a compromise.  Once the 
council was satisfied, it was passed to the governor of the island for his assent. 
                                                 
24 Petley, Slaveholders in Jamaica, pp. 62-4; Brathwaite, Creole society, pp. 47-9 
25 Whitson, Jamaica, pp. 20-4, 40-51; Spurdle, Early West Indian government, pp. 29-30; Metcalf, 
Royal government, pp. 23-30; Hall, ‘Political developments’, pp. 76-98; Brathwaite, Creole society, pp. 
50-9 
26 Spurdle, Early West Indian government, pp. 30-2; Brathwaite, Creole society, p. 51 
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As in Ireland though, this was only the first stage in the process, since the Crown and 
Parliament in Britain insisted they had the right to approve or disapprove acts passed 
by colonial assemblies.  Efforts to impose a version of Poynings’ Law on Jamaica 
were abandoned in 1681, and the assembly usually refused to incorporate suspending 
clauses into bills that would defer their operation of the act until they were approved 
in London, but some degree of oversight remained.27  At the end of a session the acts 
were sent to the secretary of state for the southern department – or, after 1795, for the 
colonies – and were then passed to the Board of Trade to be reviewed.28  The privy 
council was then duly advised whether to confirm or disallow them, or let them ‘lie 
by’ without any further action.  The process therefore lacked the very close level of 
imperial control exercised in Ireland under Poynings’ Law before 1783, where the 
Irish and British privy councils could both amend and disallow bills, but it still had 
multiple veto points which permitted parties in the assembly or council in the island, 
or the governor, of the Board of Trade, Colonial Office, Privy Council and Parliament 
to block colonial legislation.  For example, the ‘West India lobby’ of merchants, 
absentee planters and slave traders in London generally proved useful in helping 
legislation through the privy council, but also blocked several efforts by the assembly 
to undermine their interests by taxing slave imports or non-resident proprietors.29 
 
 [Insert Figure A here] 
                                                 
27 Whitson, Jamaica, pp. 70-109; Alexander L. Murray, ‘The constitutional development of Jamaica, 
1774-1815’, (MA Thesis, University of London, 1956) pp. 15, 21-39 
28 Spurdle, Early West Indian government, pp. 28-9; Douglas M. Young, The Colonial Office in the 
early nineteenth century (London, 1961) pp. 196-200; David B. Swinfen, Imperial control of colonial 
legislation, 1813-1865: a study of British policy towards colonial legislative powers (Oxford, 1970) pp. 
11-42  
29 Metcalf, Royal government, pp. 47, 185-6; Frank Wesley Pitman, The development of the British 
West Indies: 1700-1763 (London, 1967) pp. 31-40, 79-85; Murray, ‘Constitutional development’, pp. 
5-7; Lillian M. Penson, The colonial agents of the British West Indies: a study in colonial 
administration, mainly in the eighteenth century (London, 1924) pp. 70-6, 121-32, 216-25 
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It is all the more remarkable then that the island actually saw an exceptional high 
level of legislative activity.  There were at least 5,657 legislative initiatives introduced 
into the assembly between its first session in 1664 and the end of the system of 
enslaved labour in 1839, ranging from successful statutes to bills that were ‘ordered’ 
but never even brought to their first reading.  More were probably introduced between 
1664 and 1709, but the loss or damage of early volumes of assembly minutes means 
that these were not included in the printed volumes and indices used for this study, 
which relies mainly on the fourteen volumes produced between 1811 and 1829 as the 
Journals of the House of Assembly and covering the years 1664 to 1826, or the Votes 
subsequently printed and collated during each session between 1826 and 1839.  The 
sparse nature of the minutes themselves also makes it impossible systematically to 
include petitions and other appeals that were clearly intended to elicit legislation.  At 
least 3,325 passed in some form, a rate of success that was broadly comparable with 
the legislatures of Britain and Ireland before 1800.  The volume of acts passed rose 
even faster, hitting about fifteen or twenty per year between 1730 and 1765, a level 
that was broadly in line with other major colonial legislatures in North America such 
as Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia and South Carolina.30  It 
occurred because a series of political victories enabled planters to secure control of 
their assembly and use this power to respond to the immense demand for legislation, 
as the following two sections with respectively demonstrate. 
 
 [Insert Table I and Table II here] 
 
                                                 
30 Olson, ‘Colonial legislatures’, p. 563 
‘Jamaican legislation’ 
13 
 
-III- 
 
Both Hoppit and Hayton argue that the growing importance of parliaments as the 
most prominent instrument of public policy in Britain and Ireland after 1692 was due 
partly to their growing capacities to ‘supply’ legislative solutions to key political, 
social and economic problems.  For example, parliamentary sessions in England 
before 1688 were irregular and unpredictable, which made for a low success rate and 
discouraged the introduction of legislation.31  This changed after 1714 and both 
houses also began to develop administrative procedures to regulate business 
efficiently, a process that can be quantified rather crudely by tracking the number of 
bills and acts per day of the session (III).32  In Britain the volume of bills doubled 
from 1.18 to 2.56 between 1660 and 1800, but the number of acts quadrupled from 
0.50 to 1.95 per day, demonstrating an unprecedented rise in efficiency.33  The Irish 
Parliament initially handled far less business, but the volume of bills per day had 
doubled by 1800, and the volume of acts tripled, as the parliament increasingly 
became ‘a relatively efficient and productive legislative machine’.34  Administrative 
refinements, political stability and greater skill and experience from legislators, 
lobbyists and petitioners therefore meant that more bills passed successfully even as 
the volume increased.  In Britain the chances fell from three quarters to less than one 
quarter between 1660 and 1800, and in Ireland they fell to forty percent before 1782, 
and converged in British rates thereafter.35  The same was true in Jamaica, where the 
assembly became more efficient and successful at producing legislation in this period.  
                                                 
31 Hoppit, ‘Patterns’, pp. 113-14 
32 Ibid. pp. 110-11 
33 Julian Hoppit and Joanna Innes, Failed legislation, 1660-1800 (London, 1997) pp. 4-5 
34 The figures are based on Hayton, ‘Long Apprenticeship’, pp. 8-9, 13; Kelly, Poynings' Law, pp. 160-
4, 242-4, 310-12, 355-7.  The quotation is from Hayton, ‘Long Apprenticeship’, p. 11 
35 Hoppit, ‘Patterns’, pp. 111-13; Hayton, ‘Long Apprenticeship’, p. 12; Kelly, Poynings' Law, pp. 160-
4, 242-4, 310-12, 355-7 
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This reflected administrative refinements and legislative experience, but also a 
reshaping of relations within the assembly and the transatlantic constitution that 
created favourable conditions for passing legislation. 
 
 [Insert Figure B here] 
 
Calculating bills and acts passed per day in the house of assembly in Jamaica suggests 
that its legislative efficiency was mixed.  It spent far more days in session than the 
Irish Parliament, but debated fewer bills, and its efficiency may even have decreased 
between 1714 and 1760 as factional confrontations disrupted the politics of the 
island.36  However, in general the average length of sessions fell even as the volume 
of business increased, declining from one hundred days before 1714 to just under 
seventy by 1839, demonstrating that the assembly were getting through more business 
in less time.  The number of bills introduced per day increased from 0.37 bills to 0.73 
bills in this period, and peaked in 1828, when the assembly debated at least sixty bills 
in only thirty six days.  Rates of success also rose, to match rates in Britain and 
Ireland.37  Only forty percent of bills were successful between 1714 and 1760, but this 
grew to nearly seventy percent after 1800, and the number of acts that were passed per 
day tripled from 0.16 to 0.49 in the same period.  During the benign political 
environment between 1788 and 1828, the rate of failure fell further to twenty percent, 
but then rebounded to about fifty percent as this gave way to acrimonious clashes in 
the 1830s over the end of slavery, contributing to an extraordinary upsurge in bills 
and a collapse in success rates.  This culminated in the constitutional crisis of 1838, as 
                                                 
36 For these conflicts, see below n. 51. 
37 Hoppit, ‘Patterns’, pp. 111-13;  Figures for Ireland are calculated from Hayton, ‘Long 
Apprenticeship’, p. 12; Kelly, Poynings' Law, pp. 160-4, 242-4, 310-12, 355-7 
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noted below, which saw the assembly dissolved after only seven days without 
introducing any bills.38 
 
 [Insert Table III here] 
 
Representative institutions in Britain, Ireland and Jamaica therefore all became more 
effective legislative machines in this period, albeit at different rates that shed a great 
deal of light on their common causes.  One was growing administrative efficiency and 
experience.  ‘Parliament only gradually came to terms with its newfound potential to 
conduct a heightened volume of legislation’, notes Hoppit, ‘[and] perhaps it took time 
to learn how to timetable bills, to order select committees or to ensure that only high-
quality proposals were considered’, though the rise of professional drafters helped to 
accelerate this process.39  The types of legislative initiatives also changed in Britain, 
shifting away from general measures towards specific local measures that were less 
likely to generate widespread opposition.40  In Jamaica the standing orders remained 
in flux for longer, probably because the assembly and its business was small enough 
that it could be carried on informally.  It nevertheless slowly enacted several measures 
in response to the rising tide of legislation, such as an order in 1769 ‘that no bill of a 
private nature shall take rise in the house but by petition from the party desiring such 
a bill, and after a report from a committee appointed to enquire into the allegations of 
such a petition’.41  As in North America, it was increasingly common to print statutes 
either singly or in collections, and from 1749 the minutes or ‘votes’ of each session 
were printed for the public, which would have helped to regularise proceedings and 
                                                 
38 Paton, No bond, pp. 118-19; Green, British slave emancipation, pp. 164-70.  For the 1830s, see 
below nn. Error! Bookmark not defined. and 76. 
39 Hoppit, ‘Patterns’, pp. 114-16;  For Ireland, see Hayton, ‘Long Apprenticeship’, p. 12 
40 Hoppit, ‘Patterns’, pp. 116-18; Innes, ‘Local acts’, pp. 78-108 
41 JHA III p. 40; VI, p. 39.  For America, see Olson, ‘Colonial legislatures’, pp. 559-60 
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facilitate drafting by lobbyists.42  The chief justice and attorney-general of the island 
noted in 1827 that bills were still generally prepared by the person that introduced 
them, and were only occasionally drafted by ‘a professional friend … [or] the Clerk of 
the House, …[or] the professional assistance of counsel’.43   
 
More important than such administrative refinements, however, was the gradual shift 
in political power in Britain, Ireland and Jamaica that led to a new consensus between 
Crown and Parliament.  In England (or Britain) the Glorious Revolution of 1688 was 
a crucial watershed.  ‘After 1688 parliament quickly asserted the power of the purse’, 
notes Hoppit, ‘which, with the full consequences of William III’s military operations, 
ensured that the timing of sessions soon became a matter of routine’.44  The Crown 
and its ministers accepted the principle that they would work through Parliament, and 
although partisan conflict between whigs and tories probably prevented an immediate 
improvement in success rates, this changed after 1714.  The same was true in Ireland, 
where a workable compact between the Irish Parliament and the Lord Lieutenant, who 
represented both the Crown and the wishes of the British Parliament, did not emerge 
until 1713.45  Hayton argues that the increasing efficiency of the Irish Parliament in 
the eighteenth century reflected a shift away from ‘the relatively disturbed state of 
Irish politics … [in] periods marked by managerial instability and popular ‘patriotic’ 
campaigns’.46  Collaboration between Irish interests and the lords lieutenant in Dublin 
Castle, either through direct management or parliamentary ‘undertakers’, made for 
                                                 
42 Frank Cundall, The press and printers of Jamaica prior to 1820 (Worcester, MA, 1916) pp. 290-354.  
For America, see Olson, ‘Colonial legislatures’, pp. 547-50, 559, 562 
43 UK Parliamentary Papers, 1826-7 (559), pp. 44, 164, 182. 
44 Hoppit, ‘Patterns’, pp. 113-14 
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more regular and predictable sessions, and there were fewer legislative failures from 
bills caught short by unexpected dissolutions or held hostage to partisan squabbles. 
 
Reducing the influence of the governor and the imperial metropole from legislation in 
Jamaica took much longer, and until 1783 successive governors usually envisaged a 
proactive role for themselves that required contentious management of the assembly 
through local allies and interest groups.47  The disastrous experience of American 
independence, however, persuaded the imperial metropole to adopt a more ‘hands-off 
policy’, and Murray concluded that ‘Jamaica’s legislative freedom … reached its 
zenith during the years between 1783 and 1813’.48  The negative checks exercised by 
the privy council remained, as noted below, but the power of the governor was mainly 
used to defend certain red lines concerning commercial regulation, imperial defence 
and, from 1807, the abolition of the slave trade and slavery.  For instance, in 
December 1808 the duke of Manchester chose to dissolve the assembly after it 
demanded that he withdraw the unpopular West India Regiments of black troops 
garrisoned on the island.49  The planters objected because the sight of black soldiers 
exercising authority threatened the strict racial boundaries erected in society.  Two 
thirds of the bills were lost by this dissolution, and had to be laid before the assembly 
again during its next session, which Manchester then dissolved in December 1809 
after a further clash, this time over a bill the planters had brought forward that banned 
                                                 
47 Whitson, Jamaica, esp. pp. 148-67; Metcalf, Royal government, pp. 16-19, 83-103, 117-33, 159-91, 
210-19; Spurdle, Early West Indian government, pp. 33-4, 68-75; O’Shaughnessy, An empire divided, 
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48 Murray, ‘Constitutional development’, pp. 16-23, 32-95.  Quotation on p. 95; Metcalf, Royal 
government, p. 237; Manning, British colonial government, pp. 61-73 
49 Roger N. Buckley, The British Army in the West Indies: society and the military in the revolutionary 
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nonconformist ministers and missionaries from preaching to slaves.50  Legislative 
failures were also caused by intense partisan divisions within the assembly, such as 
the clashes between planters, merchants and privateers in the 1680s and 1690s, and 
planters and merchants in the 1750s.51  Renewed clashes between pro- and anti-
slavery parties in the 1820s and 1830s contributed to the fall in success rates noted 
above, as parties tried to sabotage contentious legislation or rendered the sessions 
unmanageable.52   
 
The same applied to the assembly’s relationship with the council in Jamaica and the 
privy council in Britain, which were both intended to act as checks on the chamber 
and guardians of imperial interests.  Appointed by the governor from among planters 
and merchants in the island, the council asserted that it had the same rights as the 
upper houses of Britain and Ireland, to initiate its own bills, though only forty or so 
were introduced before the practice ceased in the 1770s, and the assembly rejected all 
but four of them.  It retained, however, its power to amend and reject bills sent up to it 
from the assembly, and although the assembly continued to clash with the council 
over the exercise of its executive powers, by the late eighteenth century there was a 
more cooperative legislative relationship.53  Nearly ten percent of bills were amended 
across this period, a proportion that remained relatively stable despite the increasing 
volume of legislation, but whereas over forty percent of amended bills ultimately 
failed up to 1760, this fell by more than six percent before 1800, and in the early 
                                                 
50 Murray, ‘Constitutional development’, pp. 23-33; Mary Turner, Slaves and missionaries: the 
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nineteenth century just under three quarters of amended bills ultimately passed.  Bills 
on slavery and the courts had a higher chance of being amended, but bills on finance 
and government had a much higher failure rate, because the assembly firmly refused 
to concede that the council had the right to amend supply bills.54  It therefore looks 
like the council began to play a far more constructive role in legislation, and although 
the percentage of failed bills lost there actually increased in this period, from sixteen 
percent of bills before 1760 to about a quarter between 1760 and 1839, this may be 
because the assembly was now secure enough not to feel the need to turn every minor 
dispute into a tussle over fundamental constitutional principles. 
 
 [Insert Table IV here] 
 
By the same token, studies focussing on specific areas of legislation such as slavery, 
or the constitutional conflicts between Jamaica and the imperial metropole, can give 
the misleading impression that the Board of Trade and the privy council in Britain 
began to crack the whip with increasing frequency in this period, using their power to 
disallow legislation to shape colonial policy.  In fact the statistical survey confirms 
that the privy council exercised its authority very sparingly indeed (V).55  More than 
forty acts were disallowed between 1664 and 1760, mostly during the political clashes 
of the 1750s, but this was only around four percent of the total acts passed, and the 
colonies in North America experienced broadly similar rates.56  Another forty or so 
were disallowed between 1760 and 1839, but more than of half of them occurred 
during in the 1820s and 1830s, and still represented only two percent of acts passed, 
                                                 
54 Metcalf, Royal government, pp. 30, 45-6, 171, 177-8, 184-5 
55 Elmer Beecher Russell, The review of American colonial legislation by the King in council (New 
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though for Ireland between 1783 and 1800 this was less than half a percent.57  Acts 
relating to slavery were twice as likely to be disallowed as others, reflecting the 
particular efforts by the metropole to check abuses.58  The ratio of acts confirmed by 
the privy council also fell throughout this period, from fifteen percent before 1760 to 
three percent thereafter.  More than forty percent of these were private acts, in which 
the privy council took a particular interest, though only a quarter of all private acts 
were formally confirmed.59  As in Ireland, the privy council therefore exercised its 
powers increasingly judiciously, and mainly in areas of key imperial concern such as 
trade, defence, slavery and the rights of individuals.60 
 
 [Insert Table V here] 
 
Of the 2,569 or so failed legislative initiatives introduced in Jamaica between 1664 
and 1839, about twenty percent were blocked by council, four percent by the privy 
council, and only one percent by the governor.  Three quarters of all legislative 
failures therefore occurred within the assembly itself, a ratio that largely remained 
static.  This was lower than in Britain, where nearly ninety percent of bills failed in 
the lower house, but similar to Ireland between 1782 and 1800.61  This points to a 
remarkable degree of constitutional stability, and suggests that a focus on points of 
political conflict risks misrepresenting the real experience of colonial legislation for 
elites in North America and the West Indies.  Most bills were generally defeated by 
internal opposition, and colonial resentment at imperial obstruction – the Crown ‘has 
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refused his assent to laws’, Jefferson noted first in 1776, ‘the most wholesome and 
necessary for the public good’ – was restricted to a very small subset of laws, though 
the experience of Jamaica suggests that these tended to be the most controversial and 
important ones.  The experience of Jamaica also challenges Olson’s assumption that 
growing legislative activity created the conditions for outright independence, a point 
that is discussed in more detail in the conclusion.  Legislation was not disallowed at a 
lower rate than elsewhere, and neither did the transatlantic constitution weigh less 
heavily.  Elites in Jamaica were equally determined to enjoy legislative autonomy but 
did not resort to rebellion to secure it, and were consequently able after 1783 to enjoy 
this autonomy within the circuit of the transatlantic constitution, at least until the rise 
of abolitionism in the early nineteenth century undermined this relationship. 
  
 [Insert Table VI here] 
 
-IV- 
 
The experience of Jamaica also suggests that the decision not to rebel in 1776 did not 
reflect any lack of legislative experience.  As noted above, the volume of legislation 
had already increased enormously by this period, and, as in other territories, much of 
it was intended to serve the needs of local interest groups.  Hoppit notes that between 
1660 and 1800 three quarters of the business that came before the British Parliament 
had very little to do with ‘official’ government business such as taxation and warfare, 
and instead reflected the private interests of individual members.62  ‘Much legislation 
was local’, he concludes, ‘and much of it demand led’.  Recent work has shown the 
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impact that various lobbying groups – such as the ‘West India interest’ – could have 
in driving forward legislation at Westminster.63  As the Irish Parliament developed it 
similarly began to be used by local social and economic interest groups, who set up 
sophisticated mechanisms to lobby key parties in both Britain and Ireland.64  Olson 
suggested that interest groups in North America began to look to assemblies for the 
opportunities they offered for ‘the regulation of competing economic, ethnic and 
religious groups in an increasingly pluralistic society’, a conclusion supported by the 
growing extent of legislative petitioning in colonies such as Virginia, Pennsylvania 
and New Jersey.65  The same was true in Jamaica, where the bulk of legislation was 
introduced by local elites and was intended to serve local needs and interests. 
 
In Jamaica the members of the assembly set the legislative agenda.  As noted above, 
most of the bills introduced by the council were rejected, and the British privy council 
had virtually no legislative role after 1679, though both the Colonial Office and the 
privy council sometimes tried to suggest or recommend legislation to the assembly.66  
The imperial parliament in Westminster legislated for Jamaica and other possessions 
with increasing frequency, and the threat of imperial legislation was sometimes more 
than enough to prompt bills in the assembly, such as the slave registration act of 1817 
and the emancipation act of 1834, which were passed specifically to forestall imperial 
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intervention.67  These were exceptions, however, and an attempt to force Jamaica and 
other islands to reform their prisons in 1838 led to a constitutional crisis that nearly 
brought down governments in both Britain and Jamaica.68  Governors could try to 
recommend bills to the house, but usually needed allies and patronage to get anything 
done who would pass them.69  ‘So long as the Mother Country abstains from asking 
support from her colony, … the Governor is under no necessity of having recourse to 
party or to any leading interest’, one governor told the Colonial Office in 1799, for 
instance‘…but the moment pecuniary assistance is asked … [the governor] must be a 
party man to carry the objects asked for’.70  Bills therefore mainly arose from 
petitions laid before the house, by the advice of standing or ad hoc committees in the 
assembly, or by members on behalf of their constituents, on matters ranging from the 
state of the island’s prisons to the civil rights of Jews and free people of colour.71   
 
The broader role of such groups in creating legislation can be seen by breaking down 
the assembly’s legislative output into individual categories.  The study of failed 
legislation in the British parliament by Hoppit and Innes identified ten categories of 
legislation, which were then adopted by Hayton and Kelly in their work on the Irish 
parliament and have been adapted here.  All have noted that this approach has its 
limitations, given thematic overlaps that inevitably occur.72  For Jamaica this process 
is complicated even further by the ubiquity of slavery, which was addressed both by 
unique measures such as the consolidated slave codes issued in 1795, 1816 and 1826 
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and also in a piecemeal fashion as subsidiary clauses in other legislation.  The 
decision has been taken here to reallocate bills on public and private finance (2) to 
government (1) and the economy (7) respectively, and instead to use this category to 
cover all public bills related to issues of slaves and slavery, but also to allocate 
personal bills relating to individual grants of rights to the category for private bills (1).  
For ease of analysis, these categories have also been grouped into four major themes.  
‘Personal’ legislation (A) includes all private bills, and ‘Slavery’ (D) all slavery bills, 
while ‘Public’ (B) includes government (1), law and order (3) and the military (5), 
and ‘Society’ (C) contains bills relating to religion (4), society (6), the economy (7) 
and transportation (8).  Although no substitute for the detailed studies of individual 
initiatives noted earlier that have exposed the workings of legislation in the British 
Isles, a broad survey of these categories nevertheless confirms that the bulk of the acts 
passed by the assembly reflected the needs of interest groups in the island. 
 
 [Insert Table VII here] 
 
Despite central importance of slavery to the society and economy of the island, only 
369 legislative initiatives and 190 acts specifically dealt with slaves, free persons of 
colour and maroons, just under seven percent of all bills and legislation.  This reflects 
the effectiveness of the slave codes created by the island in the late seventeenth 
century, which made it unnecessary for substantial subsequent legislation change.  
Though mainly uncoordinated and largely ad hoc responses to events, albeit shaped 
by a relatively consistent culture of racial prejudice and economic concern, the slave 
laws gave planters essentially discretionary authority over their slaves, backed up by a 
system of courts, prisons and workhouses, allowing new issues to be accommodated 
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in a relatively informal manner.73  A very useful parallel can be drawn with the penal 
laws of Ireland, which were created to address a very similar problem of controlling a 
hostile population.74  Sean Connolly has concluded that they were, nevertheless, ‘a 
series of measures emerging piecemeal … out of complex negotiations … [with] 
successive Irish executives, their masters in London and the parliament … in Dublin’, 
which were enforced either informally or through local courts, and required only 
occasional tweaking.  In both islands, large-scale legislation was therefore only 
necessary once the underlying principles of the codes had been brought into question, 
such as during the brief period of Catholic relief in Ireland from 1778 to 179375, and 
the eras of abolition, amelioration and emancipation in Jamaica between 1783 and 
1839, when society and its institutions had to be overhauled.76 
 
The legislative agenda in Jamaica was instead dominated throughout this period by 
bills relating to the business of government, administration, taxation, law and order 
and the military.  At least 3,137 bills were introduced, nearly sixty percent of all bills, 
and 1,902 were passed into law, with the rate of success rising from more than forty 
percent in the early eighteenth century to more than seventy percent after 1800, even 
as the total number of bills doubled from fifteen to thirty per year.  The bulk of these 
were the annual votes of supply, which by the late eighteenth century included bills 
for the land, poll, deficiency, stamp, rum and customs taxes, and the bills regulating 
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the militia and martial law.77  They were drawn up and shepherded through the house 
by a standing committee named the commissioners of public accounts, who handled 
financial policy in response to the directions of the house and, by the 1750s, ‘in all 
essence it was the Treasury Board of the island’.78  Other issues with extensive runs of 
legislation included the powers of the assembly and patent officials, the needs of the 
parish vestries and local government, and the reform of courts and the law, all clearly 
in response to grievances from colonial planters and merchants.  For example, from 
1752 to 1820 there were at least thirteen bills aimed at reforming writs of replevin, a 
common law remedy allowing plaintiffs to recover property rather than the monetary 
value of it.  Most seem to have been re-enactments of a statute introduced in 1752 ‘to 
give a recompense to persons that shall be unduly vexed by them’, but later acts 
included several refinements, and – illustrating the difficulty of isolating slavery from 
other topics – three bills in 1801, 1817 and 1819 included measures to reform the 
writs of replevin and venditioni when they were used by courts to confiscate slaves. 
 
Well over half of growing legislative output of the assembly between 1664 and 1839 
was therefore driven by the fiscal, military and judicial needs of colonial rule, but the 
sheer volume of legislation was also partly deliberate.  Supply bills were voted only 
for one or two years at a time so that the governor would have no choice but to recall 
the house each year in order to renew them.79  Similar tactics were used in Britain 
after 1688 and in Ireland after 1695, with considerable success, and in Jamaica the 
assembly continued to rely on this strategy well into the early nineteenth century, 
having carefully ensured that the permanent revenue would be too small to allow the 
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governor to dispense with them.80  Thus, although the duke of Manchester dissolved 
the assembly in December 1809, he had to climb down and recall it in November 
1810 because it had failed to renew the grants necessary to subsidise the imperial 
garrison.81  Passing short bills that would expire before they could be seen and 
disallowed in Britain by the privy council was another tactic that artificially inflated 
the level of legislation.82  The conditions of colonial and imperial politics in Jamaica 
therefore generated a disproportionate amount of routine public legislation, far in 
excess of what would otherwise have been sufficient, but this seems to have been 
tolerated by elites because it secured important political concessions and perhaps also 
because it then created opportunities to pass other, unrelated, legislation. 
 
Thus, at least 1,574 legislative initiatives or nearly thirty percent dealt with matters 
that did not relate to the core business of taxing and policing the island, but concerned 
social issues, religion, the economy and transportation.  Just under half passed.  Both 
the amount of legislation and the chances of success increased after 1760, despite the 
bills competing with a growing volume of public legislation in shorter sessions.  
Social and economic bills therefore did not dominate sessions the way they did in 
Britain, where well over fifty percent of bills concerned such matters, but in this 
respect the British parliament was itself exceptional.  A disproportionate number of 
British bills were enclosure acts, but in Jamaica and Ireland these were unnecessary, 
since conquest and land reallocation had removed the legal obstacles and customary 
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rights that enclosure acts were intended to address.83  Economic bills predominated in 
Jamaica, with 673 bills compared to 375 on society and 405 relating to transport, and 
only 106 relating to religion.  All enjoyed similar rates of overall success, with the 
social bills slightly more likely to pass and economic bills a bit less likely, though this 
varied enormously year by year.  Although more work is needed to understand how 
these bills eventually reached the statute book and their effect on the cultural, social 
and economic development of the island, the process was probably not a top-down 
one, since the majority of bills seem to have concerned local issues and were raised, 
as in Britain and Ireland, by local interest groups for specific purposes.84   
 
For instance, although for various reasons the abundant turnpike legislation of Britain 
was absent, the state of the roads was a constant concern to local planters, who pushed 
their members to obtain both general legislation setting highway policy and local acts 
creating bridges, turnpikes and toll-gates.85  The bills was clearly based on English 
practice but adapted to local circumstances.  For instance, a toll-gate was established 
on the main road between the major towns of Kingston and Spanish Town in 1677 to 
maintain the ferry there, and William Peete was granted the right in 1736 to collect 
the tolls, but was also obliged to keep it in good repair, ‘and examine all negroes and 
other slaves travelling that way without letters or tickets, and detain and send them to 
their owners’.86  Such measures helped to control the movement of slaves.87  Other 
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bills helped to regulate economic matters such as drainage, livestock, retailing, credit 
and currency, and weights and measures, or dealt with rivers, harbours and wharfs, or 
patterns of trade.  About sixty bills were introduced to patent improved techniques 
and machinery for grinding cane, boiling and distilling sugar, for pulping and drying 
coffee, and for a variety of other inventions, including one granted to Ezra Waldo 
Weld in 1800 ‘for an exclusive privilege in the making of a newly-invented machine 
for the cleansing of clothes, called the New Laver’.88  Bills on social issues included 
legislation concerning labour relations, charitable donations, poor relief, immigration, 
schools, hospitals and prisons, as well as bills for the improvement of towns such as 
Kingston that mirrored similar legislation in the British Isles.89   
 
Finally, at least 547 or ten percent of bills across this period related to private matters, 
compared to fourteen percent in the Irish parliament and nearly thirty percent in the 
British parliament up to 1800.90  Like their counterparts in the British Isles, elites in 
Jamaica often complained of the inefficiency and partiality of the courts on both sides 
of the Atlantic, and seem to have found legislation a useful alternative for complex 
estate settlements, a problem exacerbated in Jamaica by a notoriously high death rate 
that left many estates almost hopelessly entangled and in the hands of minors.91  
There were far fewer elite families in Jamaica though – perhaps only a few hundred, 
in a population of 20,000 or 30,000 whites – so the volume of legislation was much 
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91 Trevor G. Burnard, ‘“The countrie continues sicklie”: white mortality in Jamaica, 1655-1780’, Social 
History of Medicine, 12 (1999) pp. 45-72.  For complaints about the courts, see Manning, British 
colonial government, pp. 151-62; Murray, ‘Constitutional development’, pp. 193-225; Brathwaite, 
Creole society, pp. 16-20. 
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lower, and only 214 estate bills came before the assembly.92  About two thirds were 
successful, as in Ireland, compared to three quarters in Britain.93  There were also 24 
bills on miscellaneous topics, such as the dissolution of the marriage between the 
Kingston merchant Edward Manning and his wife Elizabeth in 1739 after a public 
scandal.94  The remaining two thirds of the personal bills, just over three hundred, 
concerned the manumission of individual slaves or the grant of limited civil privileges 
to free persons of colour.95  ‘Contrary to the assumption of many historians these acts 
were neither sweeping nor generous’, note Edith and Samuel Hurwitz, granting only 
the power to testify in criminal or (sometimes) criminal cases, but they nevertheless 
constituted a very substantial proportion of all the private bill legislation going 
through the assembly.  Local circumstances therefore affected the specific make-up of 
public and private bills compared to Britain and Ireland, as in North America, but all 
these regions ultimately used law and legislation in the broadly same way. 
 
-V- 
 
Between its first session in 1663 and the end of slavery and enslaved labour in 1839, 
at least 5,657 legislative initiatives came before the house of assembly of Jamaica, of 
which about 3,325 passed.  Although many were subsequently repealed or disallowed, 
or were only of temporary duration, the assembly nevertheless passed a huge corpus 
of legislation that aimed to reshape the politics, society and economy of the island in 
                                                 
92 Brathwaite, Creole society, pp. 105-50 
93 Kelly, ‘Private bill legislation’, pp. 84-6, 88-90, 95; Hoppit, ‘Patterns’, pp. 119, 120, 123-5 
94 Trevor G. Burnard, ‘‘A matron in rank, a prostitute in manners...’: the Manning divorce of 1741 and 
class, race, gender and the law in eighteenth century Jamaica’, in Verene Shepherd, ed., Working out 
slavery, pricing freedom: perspectives from the Caribbean, Africa and the African diaspora (London, 
2002) pp. 133-52 
95 Heuman, Black and White, pp. 4-6, 45-50; Brathwaite, Creole society, pp. 168-72; Samuel Hurwitz 
and Edith Hurwitz, ‘A token of freedom: private bill legislation for free negroes in eighteenth-century 
Jamaica’, William and Mary Quarterly, 24 (1967) pp. 423-31 
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ways that now need to be fully explored.  The creation of the slave code in this period 
was therefore only one aspect – and, in legislative terms, a wholly unexceptional one 
– of its wider legislative output of the assembly.  The pattern of legislation shows that 
most bills were mainly, as Long claimed, ‘incidental [i.e. relating] to the colony and 
calculated for the relief and benefit of its inhabitants, who … [are] the best judges of 
the evils they feel and their proper remedies’.96  As in Britain and Ireland in the same 
period, and North America, the island therefore experienced its own particular version 
of a revolution in legislative practice and power by the late eighteenth century, with 
vast volumes of law being produced as these societies worked to respond to political, 
social and economic change.  The colonial legislature was therefore an important part 
of the system of imperial rule, in the West Indies as much as in North America, and 
clearly served a useful purpose for the local elites who dominated it.  Over ninety 
percent of bills failed in the assembly or council, both staffed almost wholly by local 
elites, suggesting that imperial authority was usually exercised with a light touch and 
that the pressure for legislation mainly came from elites themselves.  It also opened 
up the political system and allowed policy to be debated publicly, and, as in Britain, 
‘focussed power and responsibilities in remarkable and relatively public ways’.97 
 
The confrontations that dominate the historiography of imperial rule in Jamaica and 
the West Indies were therefore not representative of the legislative process.  They 
were nevertheless important, both because the most important bills tended to be the 
most controversial ones, and because these clashes delineated the political space in 
which the assembly could exercise its powers to make law.  Olson argued that in 
North America the assemblies gained power ‘not only through their successful 
                                                 
96 Long, History vol. i, 21 
97 Hoppit, ‘Patterns’, pp. 125-31.  Quotation on p. 125. 
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encounters with the colonial governors but also through their developing ability to 
handle the legislative needs of their constituents’, but this survey has shown that the 
two elements were in fact interrelated, since the process of addressing these needs 
both reflected and extended the power of the assembly in Jamaica.98  They were also 
common to both the West Indies and North America, lending support to arguments by 
Greene and others that the American Revolution therefore amounted to an exogenous 
and largely contingent set of factors specific to the mainland colonies, rather than a 
separate and divergent process of political and institutional development.  Jamaican 
elites toyed with the idea of independence but went no further.99  The transatlantic 
constitution buckled but it did not break, as it would do again in 1838, and provided a 
framework that continued to support the expansion of Jamaica’s legislative power 
beyond 1783 in ways that would benefit from more sustained examination that can be 
offered here.100  The experience of Jamaica in the long eighteenth century therefore 
demonstrates that Britain, Ireland, North America and the West Indies all enjoyed 
multiple overlapping paths of political development in the eighteenth century that 
nevertheless shared a common focus, and amounted in general to a transatlantic 
legislative revolution. 
                                                 
98 Olson, ‘Colonial legislatures’, p. 566 
99 For the reasons why Jamaica and the West Indies did not revolt in 1776, see O’Shaughnessy, An 
empire divided, esp. pp. 81-134; Metcalf, Jamaica, pp. 181-91. 
100 Greene, Peripheries pp. 207-10.  For an example of such an examination, which nevertheless does 
deal in depth with legislation, see P.J. Marshall, Remaking the British Atlantic: the United States and 
the British Empire after American Independence (Oxford, 2012), pp. 118-35, 158-75, 281-92 
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‘Patterns of Jamaican legislation’: Appendix 
 
Aaron Graham 
 
(I) Numbers of bills and acts in Britain, Ireland and Jamaica, 1660-1839 
 
 England/Britain Ireland101 Jamaica 
 Bills Acts % Bills Acts % Bills102 Acts % 
1660-1714 5,434 2,316 42.6 - - - 716 393 54.9 
1714-1760 4,831 3,549 73.5 929 514 55.3 1,267 531 41.9 
1760-1800 10,976 8,351 76.1 2,402 1,545 64.3 1,765 1,119 63.4 
1760-1782    885 488 55.1    
1782-1800    1,517 1,057 69.7    
1660-1800 21,151 14,216 66.8 3,331 2,059 61.8 3,748 2,043 54.5 
1800-1839    - - - 1,909 1,282 67.2 
1660-1839       5,657 3,325 58.8 
 
(II) Numbers of acts in selected colonial legislatures, 1730-65 
 
Colony103 1730-35 Rank 1740-45 Rank 1760-65 Rank 
Massachusetts 17.1 3 23.1 3 31.5 2 
New York 13.3 7 25.2 2 27.0 3 
Pennsylvania 4.3 10 5.0 10 12.1 8 
Virginia 31.3 1 31.6 1 37.8 1 
South Carolina 13.8 6 16.0 6 12.0 9 
Average 14.98 - 16.97 - 20.8 - 
Jamaica 14.0 5 12.8 7 19.0 6 
 
(III) Numbers of bills and acts per day of sessions in Britain, Ireland and 
Jamaica, 1660-1839 
 
 England/Britain Ireland Jamaica 
 Bills Acts Days104 Bills Acts Days105 Bills106 Acts Days 
1660-1714 1.18 0.50 4,597 - -  0.21 0.11 3,481 
1714-1760 1.00 0.73 4,856 0.45 0.25 2,043 0.29 0.12 4,334 
1760-1800 2.56 1.95 4,286 0.90 0.58 2,667 0.55 0.35 3,223 
1760-1782    0.74 0.41 1,197    
1782-1800    1.03 0.72 1,470    
1660-1800 1.54 1.03 13,742 0.71 0.44 4,710 0.34 0.19 11,038 
1800-1839    - - - 0.73 0.49 2,604 
1660-1839       0.42 0.24 13,642 
 
                                                 
101 I have been unable to find consistent statistics for bills and acts between 1660 and 1703.  For 1703-
13, see Kelly ‘Poyning’s Law’ 
102 Calculated from 1688.  See main text. 
103 Based on Olson, ‘Colonial legislatures’, p. 563. 
104 Calculated from Hoppit ‘Failed’ p. 4 
105 Hayton, ‘Long apprenticeship’, p. 9 
106 See n. 102. 
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(IV) Number of bills amended in Council in Jamaica, as percentage of total 
bills, and final outcomes, 1660-1839 
 
 Bills Amended % of bills Passed Failed % passed 
1660-1714 716 89 12.4 50 39 43.8 
1714-1760 1,267 138 10.9 81 59 42.1 
1760-1800 1,765 125 7.1 78 47 37.6 
1800-1839 1,909 189 9.9 137 52 27.5 
1660-1839 5,657 541 9.6 346 197 36.3 
 
 
(V) Privy Council, confirmations and disallowances 
 
 Acts Confirmed % of acts Disallowed % of acts 
1660-1714 393 86 21.9 18 4.6 
1714-1760 531 78 14.7 30 5.6 
1760-1800 1,119 43 3.8 11 1.0 
1800-1839 1,282 34 2.7 39 3.0 
1660-1839 3,325 241 7.2 98 2.9 
 
 
(VI) Final stage of failed and disallowed bills, by number and percentage, 
1660-1893 
 
 Failures107 Assembly % Council % Governor % PC % 
1660-
1714 
338 239 70.1 73 21.4 8 2.3 18 5.3 
1714-
1760 
767 626 81.7 94 12.3 17 2.2 30 3.9 
1760-
1800 
657 502 76.4 143 21.8 1 0.2 11 1.7 
1800-
1839 
690 479 71.9 169 25.4 3 0.5 39 5.9 
1660-
1839 
2,452 1,846 78.4 479 19.7 29 1.2 98 4.0 
 
                                                 
107 See above, n. 102, concerning 1664 to 1688.  This total has been adjusted to include the 98 acts in 
this period that passed successfully but were then disallowed by the privy council. 
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(VII) Legislative initiatives by category, with percentages of failures, 1660-1839 
 
 0  
Personal 
1 
Government 
2  
Slavery 
3  
Law  
4 
Religion 
5 
Military 
6 
Society 
7 
Economic 
8  
Transport 
9 
Misc 
 No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
1660-1714 67 44.8 209 52.6 21 47.6 119 42.0 28 25.0 55 40.0 39 46.2 100 51.0 57 40.4 2 50.0 
1714-1760 93 38.7 454 52.6 97 57.7 116 62.9 14 57.1 141 57.4 74 64.9 191 70.2 84 70.2 0 - 
1760-1800 192 14.1 484 30.0 124 44.4 223 55.6 17 52.9 214 32.2 135 37.8 214 43.5 159 47.2 0 - 
1800-1839 195 21.5 646 22.8 127 45.7 288 51.0 47 53.2 188 14.9 127 42.5 168 42.3 105 36.2 0 - 
1663-1839 547 24.7 1,793 35.8 369 48.5 746 52.8 106 46.2 598 33.4 375 45.6 673 51.9 405 48.1 2 50.0 
Britain - 23.2 - 54.5 - n/a - 53.9 - 47.1 - 27.5 - 48.7 - 34.1 - 25.8 - 54.3 
 
 
(VIII) Legislative initiatives by theme, as percentage of total legislation (%1) and percentage of failures (%2), 1660-1839 
 
 A (Personal) B (Public) C (Society) D (Slavery 
 No. %1 %2 No. %1 %2 No. %1 %2 No. %1 %2 
1660-1714 67 9.4 44.8 383 53.9 47.5 239 33.7 41.4 21 3.0 47.6 
1714-1760 93 7.4 38.7 711 56.3 55.3 363 28.7 68.6 97 7.7 57.7 
1760-1800 192 10.9 14.1 921 52.3 36.7 525 29.8 43.4 124 7.0 44.4 
1800-1839 195 10.3 21.5 1,122 59.3 28.7 447 23.6 42.1 127 6.7 45.7 
1663-1839 547 9.7 24.7 3,317 55.7 39.4 1,574 28.0 48.5 369 6.6 48.5 
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(A) Total bills and total acts in Jamaica, 1664-1839 (10 year moving average) 
 
 
 
 
(B) Success rates of total acts and total bills per day of sessions in Jamaica, 
1664-1839 (10 year moving average) 
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